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AMENDMENT AND AIDER OF PLEADINGS
By CHARLES E. CLARK and RUTH A. YERIoN*
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A MENDMENTS of pleadings at the early common law were rather
liberally allowed. In ancient times, when the pleadings were
by word of mouth, the parties were permitted to correct them
during the oral altercation.- Holdsworth states that "a survival
of the old idea that a pleader's words were not binding till avowed
by his client no doubt made it the more possible to treat pleas as
capable of amendment till one was reached by which counsel would
abide."' But by the 14th and 15th centuries, as oral pleadings were
superseded by written pleadings and formalism increased, abuses
grew up and cases were constantly thrown out of court and judg-
ments arrested and reversed for errors of form.3 It became
necessary for Parliament to provide a remedy, and this it attempt-
*This article will form a chapter in a book on Code Pleading to
be published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn. Mr.
Clark is Professor of Law, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. Miss
Yerion is Research Assistant, Law School, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn.
'Williston's Stephen, Pleading 81; Rush v. Seymour, (1712) 10
Mod. 88.2Holdsworth, Pleading, 2 Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History, 628. The learned author cities Y. B. 3 Ed. II (S.S.)
129, and Introd. lxvi, lxvii, and goes on to say: "Vhether or not this
was so, it was quite clear, as Reeves says (H.E.L. II, 223) that every-
thing advanced by counsel was, in the first instance, 'treated as matter
only in fieri which upon discussion and consideration might be amend-
ed, or wholly abandoned, and then other matter resorted to, till at
length the counsel felt himself on such grounds as he could trust.
Where he finally, rested his cause, that was the plea which was entered
upon the roll, and abided the judgment of an inquest or of the court,
according as it was a point of law or fact.'"
3Williston's Stephen, Pleading 107.
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ed to do by a series of statutes, called Statutes of Jeofails 4 and
Amendments.5
Stephen states that "At certain stages of the cause, all objec-
tions of form are cured by the different statutes of jeofails and
amendments, the cumulative effect of which is to provide that
neither after verdict, nor judgment by confession, nil dicit or non
sum informatus, can the judgment be arrested or reversed by any
objection of that kind." 6 Under these statutes pleadings could be
amended in the discretion of the court for any defect of form,
even under some authorities to the extent of changing the form
of action.7 Each statute provided a remedy for some new abuse,
or extended the time during which a preceding statute was to run.
Thus the power of the court to allow amendments was gradu-
ally increased. During the reign of William IV these powers were
still further enlarged by statute," the judges at nisi prius being
given the power of amending at trial, in case of variance. Pre-
viously at common law no amendment could be allowed except by
the full bench of the court sitting at Westminster, as the judges
4The statute was termed the Statute of Jeofails "because, if a
pleader saw and acknowledged the error (Jeo faille) he was allowed
to amend .. .These statutes were passed to remedy the fact that
writs of error were brought and judgments reversed on account of
merely verbal errors on the record." 1 Holdsworth, A Histoy of
English Law, 3rd ed., 223.5The first Statute of Jeofails was passed in 130, 14 Ed. III, C. VI.
It is as follows: " Item, it is assented, That by the Misprision of a
Clerk in any Place wheresoever it be, no Process ,.hall be annulled,
or discontinued, by mistaking in Writing one Syllable or one Letter,
too much or too little; (2) but as soon as the Thing is perceived, by
Challenge of the Party, or in other manner, it shall be hastily amended
in due Form without giving Advantage to the Party that Challengeth
the same because of such Misprision."
The second Statute of Jeofails was enacted in 1384, 8 Rich. II,
C. IV. This is quoted and the other statutes are stated chronologically
in the Appendix at the end of this article. For a thorough and detailed
review of the Statutes of Jeofails and their effect, see 2 Tidd. Practice,
953 to 960; 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, 407.
"Williston's Stephen, Pleading 161.
71 Chitty's Pleading, 16th ed., 220; Bryant, Code Pleading, 2nd ed.,
278. But the more usual view seems to have been that the form of
action could not be changed. See discussion in a later section. The
Statutes of Jeofails extended only to defects in form, not substance.
Defects of substance at common law could be taken advantage of
by general demurrer. The states of the United States adopting the
common law forms of procedure enacted the substantial provisions of
the Statutes of Jeofails. The Illinois Statutes of Amendments are
typical, embodying the essential common law requirements. See
Smith's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1921, chap. 7, p. 46.
8(1833) 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 42. See Appendix.
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on circuit were authorized to try only issues raised by the plead-
ings, not to alter the pleadings.9
The next step was taken as a part of the reforms embodied in
the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. Here provision was
made for amendments at the trial particularly affecting parties,
that no pleading should be insufficient for a defect formerly
reached by special demurrer, and generally for all amendments
necessary to determine the real question in controversy.10 No im-
portant changes occurred thereafter" until the sweeping reforms
brought about in 1873 and 1875 with the passage of the Supreme
Court of Judicature Acts. The rules under the Act of 1873 pro-
vided: "The court or a judge may at any stage of the proceedings
allow either party to alter his statement of claim or defense or re-
ply or may order to be struck out or amended any matter in such
statements respectively which may be scandalous, or which may
tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the actioh,
and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the
purpose of determining the real questions or question in contro-
versy between the parties."' 2  The rules under the Act of 1875,
which are substantially continued to date, repeated the foregoing
9Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law, 156.
loCommon Law Procedure Act of 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, which
provided in sec. 35 for amendments at the trial when there was a non-joinder and a misjoinder of parties plaintiff; sec. 37, amendments for
misjoinder of defendants before or at trial in contract actions; sec.
38, amendments on plea in abatement for nonjoinder of defendants in
contract actions; sec. 40, that where an amendment of any pleading
was allowed, no new notice to plead thereto should be necessary, also
defining the time within which the opposite party should be required
to plead thereto; sec. 51, that "no pleading shall be deemed insufficient
for any defect which could heretofore only be objected to by special
demurrer," thus overruling (1885) Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 5; sec. 222, that it
shall be lawful for the Superior Courts of Common Law and everyjudge thereof and any judge sitting in Nisi Prius, at all times to
amend all defects and errors in any proceeding in civil causes, whether
there is anything in writing to amend by or not, whether the defect or
error be that of the party applying to amend or not; and all such
amendments may be made with or without costs, and upon such terms
as to the court or judge may seem fit; and all such amendments as
may be necessary for the purpose of determining in the existing suit
the real question in controversy between the parties shall be made."
"The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125.
sec. 96, was a repetition of sec. 222 of the Common Law Proc. Act of
1852, except that it was made to apply to any proceeding under the
"provisions of this Act" instead of "in civil causes" and added "if duly
applied for" at the end. The Common Law Proc. Act of 1860, 23 & 24
Vict. chap. 126, sec. 36, repeated sec. 96 of the Act of 1854.
1236 & 37 Vict. Rules of Procedure, R. 18, p 353.
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rule 3 and went on to make provision for plaintiff's amending with-
out leave, 14 for defendant's amending his set-off or counterclaim
without leave,15 for application by the adverse party to. disallow
the amendment, 16 for application by the adverse party to plead to
the amended pleading or amend his own, 17 for allowing either
party to apply for amendment in cases not covered by the pre-
ceding provisions,' 8 for limiting the time during which an order
for leave to amend might be taken advantage of, 19 for the man-
ner in which a pleading might be amended,'20 for the way in which
an amended pleading should be marked 2' and for delivery to the
opposite party of the amended pleading. 2 In addition to these
at the present time are three rules, one providing for the correction
of clerical mistakes in judgments or orders arising from an acci-
dental slip or omission ;23 another giving the court general power
138 & 39 Vict., 1st Schedule, Rules of Court, Order 28, Rule 1;
Annual Practice 1927, 0. 28, r. 1, ("In such manner and on such terms
as may be just.")
14Ibid., n. 14, Rule 2, "once at any time before the expiration of
the time limited for reply and before replying, or, where no defence
is delivered, at any time before the expiration of four weeks from the
appearance of the defendant who shall have last appeared." Ann. Prac.
1927, 0. 28, r. 2 (adding provision for ten day period where defence
is delivered and no order is made for a reply.)
151bid., Rule 3, (before the expiration of the time allowed him for
pleading to the reply and before pleading thereto, or in case there
be no reply, then within twenty-eight days from the filing of his de-
fence.) Ann. Prac. 1927 0. 28, r. 3.
16 Ibid., Rule 4 (within eight days after the delivery to him, the court
or judge may, if satisfied that the justice of the case requires it, dis-
allow the same, or allow it subject to such terms as to costs or other-
wise as may seem just.) Ann. Prac. 1927 0. 28, r. 4.
17Ibid., Rule 5, providing for application for leave to amend; Ann.
Prac. 1927. 0. 28, r. 4 provides for pleading to the amended pleading
or amending within eight days.
8lIbid., Rule 6; Ann. Prac. 1927, 0. 28, r. 26 ("application- for leave
to amend any pleading may be made by either party in all cases not
covered by the preceding rules, and such amendment may be allowed
upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as may seem just").
'gIbid., Rule 7; Ann. Prac. 1927, 0. 28, r. 7 (14 days unless other-
wise provided or unless extended by the court or a judge).
20Ibid., Rule 8. "A pleading may be amended by written alterations
in the pleading which has been delivered, and by additions on paper
to be interleaved therewith as necessary, unless the amendments re-
quire the insertion of more than 144 worcs in any place, or are so
numerous or of such a nature that the making them in writingwould
render the pleading difficult or inconvenient to read, in either of which
cases the amendment must be made by delivering a print of the
pleading as amended." See also Ann. Prac. 0. 28, r. 8.
"Ibid., Rule 9: Ann. Prac. 1927. 0. 28, r. 9, (must be marked with
date of the day, if any, and date of amendment.)
2"1bid., Rule 10: Ann. Prac. 1927, 0. 28, r. 10.
23Ann. Pac. 1927, 0. 28, r. 11.
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to amend in any proceedings for the purpose of determining the
real question in controversy, 24 and the third providing that the
costs of an amendment shall be borne by the party making the
same unless the court or a judge shall otherwise order.2- Thus
in England has the discretionary power of the courts to grant
amendments been increased by gradual degrees until the present
very liberal system has been established.20 6 -
THE CODE PROVISIONS
The provisions in the code states in the United States have
many analogies to the present English practice. In many codes, a
whole chapter is given to amendments and generally in the others
numerous sections are devoted to the subject. In practically all
states there are also statutes dealing with the effect of variance
between pleading and proof.27 The statutes on amendments provide
first for amendments without leave of court if made within a cer-
tain period, and second, for amendments by permission of the court.
Amendments Without Leave. Of these, the Montana statute
furnishes an example:
"Any pleading may be once amended by the party of course.
and without costs, at any time before answer or demurrer filed or
twenty days after demurrer and before the trial of the issue there-
on, by filing the same as amended and serving a copy on the ad-
verse party, who may have twenty days thereafter in which to
answer, reply or demur to the amended pleading. '28
And a number of codes add a provision, of which this is typi-
cal:
"But if it shall be made to appear to the court that such amend-
ment was made for the purpose of delay or that the same was
unnecessary and the opposite party will thereby lose the benefit
of a term for which the action is or may be noticed, the amended
2-Ibid., r. 12; covering any proceedings, while Rule 1, n. 13 supra,
,was limited to the pleadings proper. See also Jud. Act. 1873, S. 34
(7); Jud. Act. 1925, S. 43.
25Ibid., r. 13; Ann. Prac. 1927, o. 28, r. 13.2aAs to the policy of the English courts in allowing amendments,
see Tildesley v. Harper, (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 393, 397, Bramwell, L. J.:
"My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have
been satisfied that the party applying was acting male fide or that by
his blunder be had done some injury to his opponent which could not
be compensated for by costs or otherwise." And see Clarapede v.
Commercial Union Ass'n, (1884) 32 W. R. 263; Lowther v. Heaver,
(1889) 41 Ch. Div. 248, 254; Re Crighton and Law, etc., Corp. Ltd.,
[19101 2 K. B. 738.27These are discussed in a later section.
28Mont. Rev. Codes 1921, sec. 9186.
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pleading may be stricken out and such terms imposed as to the
court may seem just. '29
Under the English rule as we have seen a party may amend
"without leave" under somewhat similar conditions, but the ad-
verse party may, within eight days after the delivery to him of the
amended pleading, apply to the court to disallow the amendment,
and the court may do so if satisfied that the justice of the case
requires it.30 As Hepburn has pointed out, the right of amend-
ment conferred as "of course" or "without leave" is not absolute
in either the American or English systems,31 the latter giving the
court a wider power of supervision. -3 2
Amendmnents With Leave of Court. These are provided for
in the codes by one or the other of the following statutes, common
to most of the code states, with only minor variations in wording:
"The court may on motion, in furtherance of justice and on
such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading, or proceeding
by adding or striking out the name of any party or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect;
and may upon like terms enlarge the time for an answer, replica-
tion or demurrer. The court may likewise, upon affidavit showing
good cause therefor, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon
such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or pro-
ceeding in any other particular, and may uponi like terms, allow an
answer to be made after the time limited by this act.1
3 3
29Wis. Stat. 1921, sec. 2685. Often this provision is incorporated
in the same section with allowance of pleadings as of course, since
it is a limitation on that provision. Such is the Wisconsin statute.
Other codes which have sections similar to the Montana and Wis-
consin statutes, with but slight changes in wording are: Alaska Code
1913, see. 922; Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, sec 1237, (complaint only); Calif.
C. C. P. 1923, sec. 472; Conn. Gen. Stat. 1918, see. 5664, (complaint
only); Idaho, Comp. Stat. 1919, sec. 6725; Burns, Ind. Ann. Stat. 1926,
sec. 421; Kan. Rev. Stat. 1923, sec. 60-756, (complaint only); Ky.
Carrol's Civ. Code 1927 sec. 132, (complaint only) ; Minn. G. S. 1923, sec.
9279; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 1278, (complaint only) ; Neb. Comp. Stat.
1922, see. 8653, (complaint only); Nev. Rev. L. 1912, sec. 141; N. M.
Ann. Stat. 1915, sec. 4161; N. Y. C. P. A. 1927, sec. 244; N. C. Cons.
Stat. 1919, sec. 545; N. D. Comp. L. 1913 sec. 7481; Ohio Gen. Code
1926, sec 11360, complaint; sec. 11361, adverse party after demurrer;
Okla. Rev. L. 1921, sec. 315, complaint; sec. 316, adverse party after
demurrer; Or. Code 1920, sec. 100; S. C. Code of 1922, sec. 435; S. D.
Rev. Code 1919. sec. 2376; Utah Comp. L. 1917, sec. 6618; Wis. Stat.
1919, see. 2685; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1920, sec. 5704, complaint; sec.
5705, adverse party after demurrer.30Note 16, supra.31Hepburn, Development of Code Pleading 270.
32Cf. note 26, supra. "The reformed procedure is held to prescribe
a rule of conduct rather than a rigid law." Hepburn, op. cit. 272.33Colo. C. C. P. 1921, sec. 81. For similar provisions with some
variation in wordinz see Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1913. sec. 422. amended in
1925, Ariz. Laws 1925, p. 35; Calif. C. C. P. 1923, sec. 473; Conn. Gen.
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"The court may at any time in furtherance of justice, and on
such terms as may be proper, amend any pleadings or proceedings
by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting
a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other re-
spect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case or, when
the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense,
by conforming the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved.""4
There are seventeen code states which have statutes containing
the limitation of the latter statute, apparently restricting the
amendment to one which does not change substantially the claim
or defense. There are eleven which do not contain such limita-
tion.3" But as pointed out in a later section hereof, it is often read
into the statute by judicial decision and a serious restriction on the
power to amend is thereby developed.
3 6
Form of the Amendment. Some of the codes have provisions
as to the form an amendment must take. Alaska provides that an
amended pleading must be complete in itself, without reference to
the original or any preceding amended one.37 Colorado provides
that if the complaint is amended, a copy of the amendment shall
be filed, or that the court in its discretion may require the com-
plaint as amended to be filed .3  Indiana requires that every mo-
tion to insert or strike out any part of any pleading shall be made
in writing and set forth the words sought to be inserted or stricken
out ;39 Iowa, that an amendment shall not be made by erasure or
interlineation, but on a separate paper which shall be filed and
constitute with the original but one pleading.40
Stat. 1918, sec. 5664; Idaho Comp. Stat. 1919, sec. 6726; Burns, Ind.
Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 423; Mont. Rev. Code 1921, sec. 9187; Nev. Rev.
L. 1912, sec. 142, N. Y. C. P. A. 1927, sec. 111; Utah, Comp. L. 1917,
sec. 6619 Remington, Wash., Gomp. Stat. 1922, sec. 303.34The above quotation is from Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, sec. 1239. For
other codes limiting the amendment to one which does not change
substantially the claim or defense, see Iowa, Comp. Code 1927, sec.
11182; Kan. Rev. Stat. 1923, sec. 60-759; Carroll's Ky. Civ. Code, 1927,
sec. 134; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 1274; Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9280: Neb.
Comp. Stat. 1922, sec. 8656; N. M. Ann. Slat. 1915, sec 4162; N. C. Comp.
Stat. 1919, sec. 547; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 1913, sec. 7482; Ohio Gen.
Code 1926, sec. 11363; Okla. Rev. L. 1921, sec. 318; Or. Laws, C. C. P.
1920, sec. 102; S. C. -Code L. 1922, sec. 436; S. D. Rev. Code 1919, sec.
2377; Wis. Stat. 1921, sec. 2669a; Wy. Comp. Stat. 1920, sec. 5707.
35See note 33, supra.36See discussion below.37Alaska Comp. L. 1913, sec. 927. To the same effect is N. M. Ann.
Stat. 1915, sec.-; Or. C. C. P. 1920, sec. 105; Remington Wash.
Comp. Stats. 1922, sec. 304.
38Colo. C. C. P. 1921, sec. 59.30Burns, Ind. Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 424.
40Iowa Code 1927, sec. 11184.
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Where there is no statutory direction as to the form of an
amendment, it seems to lie in the discretion of the court. The
rule is fairly general that the application to amend should be sup-
ported by affidavit setting forth the reason for the application;"
or for the delay, if there has. been one.42 The motion to amend
must not be too general.43  It has been stated that amendments
may be made in three ways, (1) by a new and separate pleading.
(2) by an additional paragraph, (3) by interlineation or mutila-
tion,44 though there are some courts which frown upon an amend-
ment made in the last-mentioned method.45
Three papers are necessary in making the motion for leave to
amend in New York; (a) a notice of motion; (b) the original
pleading; and (c) an affidavit containing the proposed amendeat
pleading. The latter need not be made a part of the affidavit, but
4'Rodman Imp. Co. v. Krabo, (1918) 185 App. Div. 882, 171 'N. Y.
617; Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants Ass'n Ins. Co., (1917) 3$ N. D.
483, 165 N. W. 545; Cunningham v. Huson Ice & Coal Co., (1921) 26
Ga. App. 302, 105 S. E. 860; Copeland v. Hugo, (1925) 212 App. Div.
129, 207 N .Y. S. 466; Bates v. Smiley, (1920) 179 N. Y. S. 552. Where
the application of a foreign corporation to amend its complaint in a
material respect was based on the affidavit of its attorney, the source
of information on which he asked the amendment must be stated.
Goodwin Preserving Co. v. Holton, (1917) 167- N. Y. S. 46. And an
affidavit to amend a claim in the court of claims can be made by the
attorney instead of the party himself only when the attorney sets forth
in the affidavit the source of his information. Murray v. State, (1920)
182 N. Y. S. 360.42Garrison v. Goodale, (1892) 23 Or. 311, 31 Pac. 709; Foxwell v.
Justice, (1921) 191 Ky. 749, 231 S. W. 509; Andrew v. Benight-Latcham
Carpet Co., (1922) 72 Colo. 472, 211 Pac. 378; Holbert v. Allred, (1920)
24 Ga. App. 727, 102 S. E. 192.43Gordon v. Anderson, (1922) 200 App. Div. 616, 193 N. Y. S. 665.
(amendment denied when the motion was to "conform pleadings to
proof."); Barker v. Walbridge, (1869) 14 Minn. 469 (amendment not al-
lowed when party asked for it to enable him to "invoke the equity
powers of the court.")", Camp v. Pollock, (1895) 45 Neb. 771, 64 N. W.
231, (denied when leave was asked to amend complaint generally.);
Smith v. Rhodes, (1903) 680 Ohio St. 500, 68 N. E. 7, (amendment
asked "so as to make excluded evidence complete" was not sufficient.)
Alben v. Ranson, (1869) 44 Mo. 263.44Fleenor v. Taggart, (1888) 116 Ind. 189. 18 N. E. 606. Cf. the
English rule, note 20, supra, and see Sutherland, Code Pleading, Prac-
tice and Forms, sec. 792. See Turner v. Hamilton, (1905) 13 Wyo. 408,
80 Pac. 664, (petition amended by filing a statement of amendment
and designating by reference where the new matter was to be in-
serted in the original or stricken out. This statement and the original
petition are to be construed together as the amended one).45Doane v. Houghton, (1888) 75 Cal. 360, 17 Pac. 426; Farrelly v.
Cross, (1849) 10 Ark. 197; Hill v. The Supervisors, (1858) 10 Ohio St.
621; Schneider v. Hosier, (1871) 21 Ohio St. 98. Contra, McKee v.
Jolly, (1919) 72 Okla. 37, 178 Pac. 656; Newman v. Buzard, (1901) 24
Wash. 225, 64 Pac. 139. For forms especially applicable to the Western
states, see Sutherland, op. cit. secs. 842 to 859.
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unless it is very simple and can be understood from the affidavit,
it should be attached to the affidavit. 6
AMENDMENTS CHANGING THE CAUSE OF ACTION
From the statutes quoted above it appears that certain states
provide that the court has discretion to conform the pleading or
proceedings to the facts proved, "when the amendment does not
change substantially the claim or defense." It further appears
that a substantial number do not in terms so restrict the power
to amend and that the states generally grant the power to amend
to a party once without leave of court and apparently without
restriction as to change of the claim or defense.4 7  It might be
concluded from this that in all code states a single amendment
at least could be made substantially changing the form of the
action and that in many such an amendment could be made sub-
stantially without limit. Such an assumption would be erroneous,
as the courts seem to have been greatly troubled by amendments
which, as usually expressed, "changed the cause of action." The
wording of the statutes which contain the limitation would seem
to restrict it to amendments made after proof, that is, at the trial.
As pointed out in the next section, the further advanced a case is,
the more hesitation the court has in granting a change
in the action. Hence courts are stricter when the amend-
ment is offered at the trial than when offered earlier. Some codes
do not apply the present rule to amendments offered before
trial. It seems to have been the view, at least on the part of many,
perhaps the greater number, of code states, however, that an
amendment changing the cause of action was improper whenever
offered.48 There seems to be a tendency towards greater liberality
at the present time, and as pointed out in succeeding paragraphs
any such dogmatic statement would probably now be misleading.
Origin of the Rule. Whence came this rule, with so little direct
basis in the statutes? The answer seems clear, that like many
other restrictions applied under the code it came from habits of
thought developed under the formulary system of the common law.
Not that the common law was entirely clear, for especially under
the later common law there are many cases allowing a change
46Carmody's New York Practice, sec. 270
17See statutes notes 29, 33, 34 above.
4sSee cases cited below, this section.
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from one form to another. 9 But it seems to have been the more
usual rule that an amendment would not be allowed if it changed
the form of action, as from assumpsit to covenant or case, or from
trespass to case or vice versa. 0 The test often stated was, did the
proposed amendment change the action "from law to law?" A
change from one form of legal recovery to another was thus
frowned upon." In fact since the formulary system of the com-
mon law served to separate different issues of fact, the problem
confronting the courts which applied the stricter rule seems in
general one of variation in legal theory, rather than in the facts
upon which recovery is asserted.
The Rule Under the Codes. We have seen elsewhere that under
the code the concept "cause of action" was developed as a re-
striction on the extent of a single claim in an action, somewhat in
substitution of the common law forms of action.32 The tendency
of many courts was, therefore, to apply it as a restriction on
amendment. And with it was taken over the common law objec-
tion of allowing a shift in the pleadings from law to law. Conse-
quently many courts came to apply the rule so that a change in the
legal theory of the action was considered a change in the cause of
action.53 Elsewhere have been stated reasons why it is believed
49Stebbins v. Lancashire Ins. Co., (1879) 59 N. H. 143, overruling
Little v. Morgan, (1855) 31 N. H. 499; Smith v. Bellows, (1875) 77
Pa. St. 441; Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co. v. Gatta, (1913) 4 Boyce
(Dela.) 38, 85 Atl. 721; McLaughlin v. West End. St. Ry. Co., (1904)
186 Mass. 150, 71 N. E. 317; Ala. Go. v. Heald, (1908) 154 Ala. 580,
45 So. 686. The rule in the federal courts was liberal in this respect.
Chapman v. Barney, (1889) 129 U. S. 677, 9 Sup. Ct. 426, 32 L. Ed.
803; Magruder v. Belt. (1895) 7 App. D. 302; but Cf the earlier cases
of Walden v. Boadley, (1840) 14 Pet. (U.S.) 156. 10 L. Ed. 398, and
Snead v. McCaule, (1851) 12 How (U.S.) 407, 13 L. Ed. 1043.
5oShipman, Common Law Pleading, 3rd ed., 296. Scott, Funda-
mentals of Procedure in Actions at Law 154; Chitty, Pleading, 16th
Am. ed., 109; Knight v. Trim, (1897) 89 Me. 469, 36 Atl. 912; Flanders
v. Cobb, (1896) 88 Me. 488, 34 Atl. 277; Sumner v. Broun, (1861) 34
Vt. 194; People v. Circuit Judge, (1865) 13 Mich. 206; Carpenter v.
Gookin, (1829) 2 Vt. 495; Perry, Common Law Pleading 101. See
generally 34 Am. Dec. 158 note; 51 Am. St. Rep. 410 note.51Hall v. Louisville, etc. Co., (C.C.Fla. 1907) 157 Fed. 464; Despeau
v. Pa., etc. Co.. (C.C.Pa. 1904) 133 Fed. 1009; Wingert v. Circuit Judge,
(1894) 101 Mich. 395, 90 N. W. 662; Church v. Boylston, etc., Co., (1914)
218 Mass. 231, 105 N. E. 883; Fournier v. Detroit United Ry.. (1909)
157 Mich. 589, 122 N. W. 229; Anderson v. Wetter (1907) 103 Me. 257,
69 AtI. 105: Bradley v. Chicago, etc., Co., (1908) 231 Ill. 622, 83 N. E.
424; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Jones, (1894) 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247.
52See articles cited in note 54 infra.
53Hallett v. Larcom, (1897) 5 Idaho 492, 51 Pac. 108, (substitution
of new plaintiff as being the real party in interest refused as a new
cause of action): Elder v. Idaho-Wash. Northern Idaho R. R.. (1914)
26 Idaho 209, 141 Pac. 982; Hackett v. Bank of Cal., (1881) 57 Cal. 335,
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that such a conception of "cause of action" is not in harmony with
the code as a whole, with specific provisions of the code such as the
requirement of "stating the facts constituting the cause of action,"
and is wholly inconvenient as a practical rule. If the cause of
action is taken as a group of facts giving rise to one or more rights
of action, it is thought that a more workable rule is obtained. The
number of such facts to be considered as a single unit will
vary in different cases, but should be governed by reasons of
practical convenience, and a change in such facts should not be a
change in the cause of action so long as the essential fact situation
remains the same. Nor, since the idea of the code is that the
pleader should confine himself to the facts, leaving so far as pos-
sible the legal theory to be developed at the argument and applied
by the court, should the legal theory be any part of the cause of
action. Under this more flexible view of the restriction it is
possible to allow amendments more freely where they relate to
the same general acts or events set forth in the original pleading.",
As a matter of fact, probably most courts would now hesitate to
apply the harsher rule where important rights are involved. The
case of amending after the statute of limitations has run, dis-
cussed below, is a case in point.55
The Rule in the Federal Courts. The federal rule has been of
much influence, due not merely to the position of these courts in
our judicial system, but also to the fact that many important cases
come before the federal courts particularly with reference to
amending in actions for death of an employee of the great inter-
state railroads. These courts early took a liberal attitude toward
(no amendment from tort to contract); Haas Bros. v. Hamburg-Bre-
man Fire Ins. Co., (1910) 181 Fed. 916, 104 C. C. A. 354; Givens v.
Wheeler, (1882) 6 Colo. 149 (no amendment from contract to tort);
Anderson v. Groesbeck, (1899) 26 Colo. 3, 55 Pac. 1086; Anthony v.
Slayden, (1900) 27 Colo. 144, 60 Pac. 826; Gibbons v. Denver Broker-
age & Cons. Co., (1902) 17 Colo. App. 167, 67 Pac. 913 (amendment
from equity to law not allowed, and vice versa); Cincinnati Hamilton
& Dayton R. R. Co. v. Bunnell, (1878) 61 Ind. 183; Lewark v. Carter,
(1888) 117 Ind. 205. 20 N. E. 119; Anderson v. Harper, (1902) 30 Wash.
378, 70 Pac. 965; (but cf. Van Behren v. Rettkowski, (1905) 37 Wash.
247, 79 Pac. 787.) See notes 34 Am. Dec. 158; 51 Am. St. Rep. 414; 3
L. R. A. (N.S.) 289, 47 L. R. A. (N.S.) 67.54Clark, the Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L. J. 817, 837; Clark,
Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 420. For
another view of cause of action, see McCaskill. Actions and Causes of
Action, 34 Yale L. J. 614. But see 34 Yale L. J. 879. Certain law
review notes advocating a harsher rule are noted, note 110, infra.
55See, in addition to that discussion, cases cited hereinafter in this
section.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
allowing amendments.58 Later there was a shift to a stricter atti-
tude due largely to the case of Union Pacific Co. v. Wyler57 where
an employee of a railroad was not allowed to change the basis
of his claim for damages for injury from the common lav to a
Kansas statute. To the argument that all the necessary facts were
stated in the original petition, Mr. Justice White replied:
"If the argument were sound, it would only tend to support the
proposition that there was no departure or new cause of action
from fact to fact, and would not in the least meet the difficulty
caused by the departure from law to law."58
But this case has been limited, if not in effect overruled by later
cases in the Supreme Court. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Wulf,59 the plaintiff, suing in her individual capacity under a Kan-
sas statute for her son's death, was allowed to amend to sue as
administratrix, under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The
court was quite emphatic that no new cause was stated, and that
the change was in form rather than in substance, since the amend-
ment did not set up a different set of facts. Later cases dealing
with amendments and with res judicata make it clear that the
Supreme Court has adopted a workable theory of the cause of
action and has abandoned the law to law rule. 60
56See cases note 49 supra.5T(1895) 158 U. S. 285, 15 Sup. Ct. 877, 39 L. Ed. 983.58This rule was then for a time followed in federal and state
courts. Boston etc. Co. v. Hurd, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1901) 108 Fed. 116,
47 C. C. A. 615, (no amendment from claim for conscious suffering of
decedent to action for wrongful death); Anderson v. Wetter, (1907)
103 Me. 257, 69 Atl. 105 (same); Despeaux v. Pac., etc., Co., (C.C.Pa.
1904) 133 Fed. 1009 (nor from statutory claim for discriminatory
charges to common law claim for over-charges); Hall v. Louisville,
etc., Co., (C.C.Fla. 1907) 157 Fed. 464 (nor from claim by widow under
Florida statute to claim by representative under Federal Employers'
Liability Act); Henderson v. Moweaqua, etc. Co. (1908) 145 Ill. App.
637 (nor from claim for common law negligence to claim under the
Mines Act); Wingert v. Circuit Judge, (1894) 101 Mich. 395, 59
N. W. 662 (from claim on Michigan statute to claim on Canadian
statute).59(1913) 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135, 57 L. Ed 355. See this
case discussed in Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L. J.
817. 6
°See Friederichsen v. Renard, (1918) 247 U. S. 208, 38 Sup. Ct.
450, 62 L. Ed. 1075. abandoning the "law to law" test, noted in 27
Yale L. J. 1053, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 242; Seaboard Air Line v. Moennecke.
(1915) 239 U. S. 352, 36 Sun. Ct. 126. 60 L. Ed. 324 (amendment al-
lowed to claim under the federal statute); N. Y. Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Kinney, (1922) 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122, 67 L. Ed. 294 (similar
ruling). See also 36 Yale L. J. 853, 14 Georgetown L. J. 407. In Chi-
cago R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schendel (1926) 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup.
Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757. a similar ruling was applied to the question of
res judicata. See 35 Yale L. J. 1016, and cf. also Baltimore S. S. Co.
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The Present Status of the Rule. Since the power to amend
rests so largely in the discretion of the court, having in mind the
facts and circumstances of a particular case, it is not safe to gen-
eralize far and only general tendencies may be noted. It seems
clear, however, that the restriction on amendment "from law to
law" is losing favor,"' and that the broader concept of the cause of
action as an aggregate of operative facts of convenient size is be-
ing generally applied.62 In fact in many courts there is very little
left of the original restrictive rule. In New York the "law to law"
test was early repudiated,63 and the position seems to have been f air-
ly consistently followed.64 It was also followed in other jurisdic-
v. Phillips, (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 60; cf. Reading Co. v. Koons, (1926)
271 U. S. 58, 46 Sup. Ct. 405, 70 L. Ed. 835, as to the date of accrual
of a cause for wrongful death under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. See 35 Yale L. J. 1016.
OrSee Goldberg v. Friedrick, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 124, 572 Atl. 186,
contra to Allen v. Tuscarora Valley R. R. Co., (1910) 229 Pa. 97.
78 Atl. 34, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1096; Friederichsen v. Renard, (1918)
247 U. S. 208, 38 Sup. Ct. 450, 62 L. Ed. 1075; Tinker v. Sauer, (1922)
105.Oh. St. 135, 136 N. E. 854, noted in 32 Yale L. J. 506. See notes in
21 Colum. L. Rev. 289; 36 Yale L. J. 853; 10 Calif. L. Rev. 202. Hep-
burn, Development of Code Pleading, sec. 306; Pomeroy, Code Reme-
dies, 4th ed., sec. 457.
62As pointed out in the articles, note 54, supra, the size of this
aggregate must be pragmatically determined, having regard mainly
to consideration of trial convenience. No single rule of thumb is
possible. The courts, however, often state such tests as, are the com-
plaint and amendment subject to the same plea. Goddard v. Perkins,
(1838) 9 N. H. 488; Proctor v. Southern Ry. Co., (1902) 64 S. C. 491,
42 S. E. 427. Does the same evidence apply? Wabash R. R. Co. v.
Bhymer, (1905) 214 Ill. 579, 73 N. E. 879; Am. Mills Co. v. Hoffman,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 285. Or the same measure of damages?
Hurst v. Detroit City Ry., (1891) 84 Mich. 539, 48 N. W. 44; Messen-
ger v. Northcutt, (1899) 26 Colo. 527, 58 Pac. 1090; Am. Mills v. Hoff-
man, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 285. Will an adjudication of
one bar the other? Davis v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. (1888) 110 N. Y.
646, 17 N. E. 733; Van Patten v. Waugh, (1904) 122 Ia. 302, 98 N. W.
119. Could both have been pleaded cumulatively in the same court?
Richardson v. Fenner, (1855) 10 La. Ann. 599. Was plaintiff's inten-
tion the same at the time of filing each? Painter v. New River Mineral
Co., (C.C.Va. 1899) 98 Fed. 544. -Does the amendment state a new and
distinct matter? Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones, (1894) 149 Ill. 361,
37 N. E. 247. Some of these tests such as that of "the same evidence"
seem positively harmful, if at all strictly applied: the rest are either
wholly vague or state results (e.g. the "res judicata" test.)
03Brown v. Leigh, (1872) 49 N. Y. 78. Cf. also, Watson v. Rush-
more, (1862) 15 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 51.
64Hopf v. U. S. Baking Co., (1892) 21 N. Y. S. 589 (tort changed
to contract); Deyo v. Morss, (1894) 144 N. Y. 216, 39 N. E 81 (tort
to contract); Heath v. N. Y. Bldg. Loan Banking Co., (1895) 146 N. Y.
260, 40 N. E. 770; Smith v. Savin et al, (1894) 141 N. Y. 315. 36 N. E.
338 (contract to tort); Levin v. Martin, (1923) 198 N. Y. S. 827 (under
the C. P. A.) But at the trial only amendments which did not sub-
stantially change the cause were allowed. Reeder v. Sayre, (1878) 70
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tions.65 In Wisconsin the limitation was adopted at an early date,6
but was discarded by the legislature in a statute passed in 1915.67 In
some jurisdictions an amendment may be had setting up any cause
which might originally.have been joined with that set forth in the
complaint.6 But all this raises the question whether the limitation
of the same cause of action should be applied at all to the
question of amendment. In certain special cases where other
rights or rights of other parties have accrued, such as amendment
after the statute of limitations has run, or where successive at-
tachments are involved, this or some similar test is obviously and
in all fairness required.6 9 But in the ordinary case it seems de-
sirable that the whole of the dispute and all the.disputes between
the parties be brought out and disposed of as soon as possible and
at one time. The court should, of course, be convinced that the
disputes are bona fide and the amendment is not for delay, and
the opposing party should be protected from surprise by a proper
continuance in the few cases where there is actual surprise. Out-
side of this, there would seem little occasion for restrictions on the
N. Y. 180; Harris v. Tumbridge, (1880) 83 N. Y. 92; Price v. Brown,
(1885) 98 N. Y. 388; Finch v. Foster Co., (1921) 197 App. Div. 172,
188 N. Y. S. 727; Cox v. Halloran, (1901) 64 App. Div. 550, 72 N. Y. S.
3u2;. Block v. Third Ave. R. R., (1901) 60 App. Div. 191, 69 N. Y. S.
1107. This rule would seem to be changed under the C. P. A. secs.
105-112, and r. 166. Smith, Problems in Connection with Motions,
25 Col. L. Rev. 752; Medina, Pleading and Practice Under the New
York Civil Practice Act 196; Copeland v. Hugo, (1925) 212 App. Div.
229, 207 N. Y. S. 446, allowing such amendment. See How v. Fox,(1925) 124 Misc. Rep. 505, 208 N. Y. S. 463; Stehlisilks Corp. v. Klein-
burg, (1924) 200 App. Div. 899, 205 N. Y. S. 399; Kent v. Erie R. R.
Co., (1922) 201 App. Div. 293, 194 N. Y. S. 629. But see Carmody, New
York Practice, sec. 411; Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Prac-
tice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 749; 26 Col. L. Rev. 60.65Colt Co. v. Kyzer (1925) 131 S. C. 78, 126 S. E. 520; Wallard
Lumber Co. v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., (1926) 134 S. C. 228, 132 S.
E. 614; Raymond v. Railway, (1897) 57 Oh. St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093; Pol-
lock v. Lumberman's Nat'l Bank of Portland, (1917) 86 Or. 324. 168
Pac. 617; Lovell v. Hammond, (1895) 66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl. 511; Dun-
nett v. Thornton, (1900) 73 Conn. 1, 46 AtI. 158; Frankel v. Garrard.(1903) 160 Ind. 209, 66 N. E. 687; Steere v. Gingery, (1909) 24 S. D.
423, 123 N. W. 863.66Supervisors v. Decker. (1874) 34 Wis. 378; Carmichael v. Ar-
gard, (1881) 52 Wis. 607, 9 N. W. 470; Gates v. Paul, (1903) 117 Wis.
170, 94 N. W. 55, comparing the Wisconsin and New York views.
67Wis. Stat., sec. 2669a. See Wulfers v. Clark Motor Co., (1924)
177 Wis. 497, 188 N. W. 652, (contract to tort); Jeleniewski v. Eck,(1921) 175 Wis. 497, 185 N. W. 540, (tort to contract); Jilek v. Zahl,(1916) 162 Wis. 157, 155 N. W. 909, ("law to equity"); See 2 Wis. L.
Rev. 381; 21 Col. L. Rev. 289.6 Raymond v. Bailey, (1912) 98 Conn. 201, 118 At. 915; Conn.
G. S. 1918. sec. 5664.6 9See discussion below.
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broad power of the court to permit amendments even "changing
the cause of action." 70
Amwndmients by a Defcndant. From the statutes quoted above,
it would appear that, at least under some codes, a defendant is not
to be permitted to amend to change substantially his defense.-'"
This in form at least is stated as a general rule.72 But generally
there are added statements that the same limitations on the power
to amend do not apply to the answer as to the complaint. 73 Thus
in Bowman v. De Peyster 4 in referring to the greater favor ac-
corded the defendant at common law also,75 the court said: "The
reason for this distinction was, that the plaintiff, if he had another
cause of action, could sue upon it afterward, while a defendant
had to avail himself of his defense in the action brought against
him or he might lose the benefit of it." This argument in favor
of the defendant would seem quite conclusive that he should not
be deprived of any real defense by an arbitrary restriction on the
power to amend.7 1 It would seem, however, to point also to a
similar rule in favor of a plaintiff. The penalty on a plaintiff
may ordinarily be not as severe as on the defendant, but in modern
congested courts it tends to become severe enough in time and
expense. And in special cases such as where it is impossible again
7oCf. Lee v. Gallagher, (1905) 15 Manitoba 677, where the court
said the test in England and Canada was not whether the amendment
set forth a new cause of action, but whether the adverse party could
be compensated for delay or inconvenience by an allowance for costs
or otherwise; and Bowers v. Good, (1909) 52 Wash. 384, 100 Pac. 848.
where Fullerton, J., says: "The fact that the amendment may intro-
duce a new issue is not alone ground for denying it. The true test is
found in the answers to the question, "Is the opposing party prepared
to meet the new issue?"
7iSee note 34, supra.
72Frelick v. Mercer, (1915) 27 Idaho 360, 148 Pac. 906; Abbot v.
Meinken, (1900) 48 App. Div. 109, 62 N. Y. S. 668; Phillips, Code Plead-
ing sec. 313.73Bliss, Code Pleading, 3rd ed., sec. 430; Bryant, Code Pleading.
2d ed. 282; Murphy v. Plankinton Bank, (1904) 18 S. D. 317, 100 N. W.
614; Cartwright v. Ruffin, (1908) 43 Colo. 377, 96 Pac. 261; See Car-
michel v. Argard, (1881) 52 Wis. 607, 9 N. W. 470, 472.
74(1867) 2 Daly (N.Y.) 203.
75Cf. Waters v. Bovell, (1748) 1 Wils. 223; Tidd's Prac., 2d Am.
ed., 653.76 Gould v. Stafford, (1894) 101 Cal. 32, 35 Pac. 429; Sutherland,
Code Pl. Prac. & Forms, sec. 805; authorities note 73, supra. The com-
mon law rule was that an amendment would not be allowed to let in
a so-called unconscionable or hard defense, such as the Statute of
Limitations. This rule is at least abrogated so that the amendment is
within the discretion of the court, and according to some decisions
it seems entirely changed. See Bryant, Code Pl., 2d ed., 287; Bliss,
Code Pl., 3d ed., sec. 451.
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to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant or where the statute of
limitations has run, it is fully as severe as in the case of a de-
fendant. The difference at most is only of degree and the wider
power to permit amendments would seem desirable.
TImE OF AMENDING
Time when Amendment is Offered as Affecting its Allowance.
The time when an amendment is offered is held by the courts to
affect its allowance. The earlier it is offered the more favorably
it is received. In fact the courts tend to draw a rather definite
line between amendments offered before trial and those offered
during or after trial. Amendments before trial may consist either
of those made without leave of court, within a certain time after
the filing of the pleading to be amended, or those made with
leave. 77 In the case of the latter, the leave is ordinarily granted
almost as a matter of course and the power of the court to do this
is said to be inherent, if there is no statute.7 8  In fact, as noted
in the previous section, the present tendency is to grant such
amendments even where they may "change the cause of action " or
defense set out in the previous pleading, though many early cases
were opposed to such change.70
Amendments During Trial. When, however, a case has
reached the stage of trial the courts are much less liberal in
granting amendments10 Under the statutes, the court has discre-
tion to permit the amendment "in furtherance of justice" and
"on such terms as may be proper" at any stage of the proceed-
ihgs.8 1 But one of the most usual reasons for the trial court's
denial of an amendment is because the party asking it has been
guilty of laches. Thus where an amendment to the answer was
tendered a year after the answer was filed, it was held not to
be an abuse of discretion to deny it.12 And where the issues had
been completed eight months before trial and defendant had been
granted several continuances, the court's refusal to permit an
amendment to the answer after plaintiff had put in his proof was
7
7See statute notes 29, 33, 34, supra.
78CL Sutherland, op. cit.
79See cases notes 61-67 supra.
BODelaney v. Delaney, (Mo. 1922) 245 S. W. 1075; Todd v. Bet-
tingen, (1907) 102 Minn. 260, 113 N. W. 906, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 263
Burke v. Baldwin, (1893) 54 Minn. 521, 56 N. W. 173.
R'See statutes, notes 33, 34 supra.
2 Goldsburg v. MacConnell, (1923) 73 Colo. 751, 215 Pac. 872.
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upheld.8 3 Where defendant asked to amend'when the trial was
almost over, it was not grafited because the defendant did not show
he had no knowledge of the fact he wished to incorporate into
the amendment at the beginning of the trial.8
An amendment was also denied when the trial was over be-
cause no affidavit was filed showing why the amendment was not
sooner tendered.8 5 And, as we have seen, courts tend to refuse an
amendment during the trial where it changes the issues.8 8 But
the chief element to be considered in allowing or refusing the
amendment is whether or not the opposite party will be prejudiced
thereby, and if he is not, the court should grant leave to amend. 87
"The time has gone by when amendments on the trial are to be
viewed with suspicion and granted grudgingly. If it appears that
the proposed amendment tends to bring the real controversy be-
tween the parties fairly before the court, the amendment should
always be allowed; opportunity being given to the opposing party
to meet it in case of surprise."88
Since the trial court has it in its power to condition the amendment
upon terms, and thus prevent injustice, an amendment should
not of necessity be refused, if the cause of action may be changed.
A continuance to protect the interests of the defendant may permit
of the eventual adjudication of the disputes between the parties
without the necessity of a new suit.
89
Amendments after Trial. "Amendments after trial are al-
lowed only with great caution and on good cause shown,"90
83Osner & Mehlhorn v. Loewe, (1920) 111 Wash. 550, 191 Pac.
746. Yet an amendment to a petition was allowed three years after
commencement of suit in James v. City of New Orleans, (1922) 151
La. 480, 91 So. 846.84Ehlers v. Gold, (1919) 169 Wis. 494, 173 N. W. 325.85Christem v. Christem, (1919) 184 Ky. 822, 213 S. W. 189.
86See preceding sectioni see also Abel v. Hounsom, (1920) 107
Kan. 741, 192 Pac. 384; Commercial Jewelry Co. v. Bowen. (1919)
145 Minn. 487, 175 N. W. 995; Long v. Kansas City, M. & 0. R. R. Co.,
(1917) 100 Kans. 361, 164 Pac. 175; Am. Mills Co. v. Hoffman, (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1921) 275 Fed. 285.87Judish v. Rovig Lumber Co., (1923) 128 Wash. 287. 222 Pac. 898;
Lakeside Packing Co. v. M. St. P. & S. S. R. Co., (1925) 187 Wis.
350, 203 N. W. 3234; Hobbs v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., (1917) 182 Ia. 316,
165 N. W. 912; Bracey v. McGary. (1919) 134 MA. 267, 106 Atl. 622;
Krueger v. Brooks, (1919) 94 Or. 119, 184 Pac. 285.88Mallon v. Tonn, (1916) 163 Wis. 366, 157 N. W. 1098.
89Cf. cases note 70 supra; Gates v. Paul, (1903) 117 Wis. 170, 94
N. W. 55; Scroggin v. Johnston, (1895) 45 Neb. 714. 64 N. W. 236;
McDonald v. Hulet, (1901) 132 Cal. 154, 64 Pac. 278. That under
the present New York rule such amendment can be had, see note 64
supra. Cf. Vickery v. N. L. & N. Ry., (1914) 87 Conn. 634, 89 Atl.
277; Sutherland, Code P: Prac. & Forms, secs. 793, 794.
O°Sutherland, Code Pl. Prac. & Forms, sec. 796 citing cases.
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Thus it is held no abuse of discretion to deny plaintiff leave to
amend, after the evidence is all submitted, or after final argu-
ment.9 So where a contract sued on stated no consideration, the
defect could not be cured by amendment after judgment, as the
court said the statute permitted amendment of formal defects
only.92 An amendment setting forth new matters of defense,
where the motion was made after judgment for plaintiff, was not
allowed during pendency of motion for a new trial.9 3 But correc-
tion of matters of form or to conform the pleadings to the proof 94
are allowed. In New York an amendment has been allowed set-
ting forth a new cause of action even after a judgment had been
satisfied.95
Amendments on and after Appeal. An appellate court, during
its review of the decision of the lower court, is usually held not
empowered to entertain original motions to amend,96 but it must
confine its adjudication to errors appearing on the record. 97 If
parties die or defendants have not been served or have assigned
their interest after the decree of the lower court, the appellate court
may permit amendments to serve those purposes.98 And issues
raised in a trial before county commissioners99 or in a chancery
court"" may be amended on appeal. Appellate courts sometimes
consider pleadings to be amended so as'to conform to proof when
no objection to the defect has been taken in the court below.,'0
In limited cases in some jurisdictions, an appellate court is author-
ized to allow amendments. A general authority of this kind is
91McMahon v. Plumb, (1916) 90 -Conn. 281, 96 Atl. 958; Thornton
v. Goodman, (Tex. Civ. App., 1916) 185 S. W. 926.
92Swift v. Cent. Union Fire Ins. Co., (1919) 279 Mo. 606, 216
S. W. 935 reversing 202 Mo. App. 419, 217 S. W. 1003.93Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Pierce, (1920) 280 Mo. 614, 219
S. W. 578.94Matthys v. Donelson, (1916) 178 Ia. 111, 160 N. W. 944; Beachy
v. Jones, (1921) 108 Kans. 236, 195 Pac. 184. Such amendments are
in the discretion of the court and a denial has been held no abuse
of discretion. Breems & Kinnear v. MacWhyte Co., (1924) 101 Okla.
247, 224 Pac. 959.95Hatch v. Central Nat'l Bank, (1879) 78 N. Y. 487.
961 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 607; Manatt v. Starr, (1887) 72 Ia. 677, 34 N. W.
784; McCall v. Webb, (1900) 126 N. C. 760, 36 S. E. 174; Patten Paper
Co. v. Green, (1896) 93 Wis. 283, 66 N. W. 601; Note L. R. A. 1916D
841-880.97See Barnes v. Christy, (1921) 102 Oh. St. 160, 131 N. W. 352.98Grant v. Ludlow"s Admr., (1857) 8 Oh. St. 1.99Harris v. Millege, (1898) 151 Ind. 70. 51 N. E. 102.
'
0 Tinker v. Sauer, (1922) 105 Oh. St. 135, 136 N E. 854. This
the court states, is allowed because in Ohio cases from the chancery
courts go to the appellate court to be tried de novo.llElwood Oil & Gas Co. v. McCoy, (1919) 72 Okla. 97, 179 Pac. 2.
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urged by writers and would seem desirable to avoid reversals
where an appellate court can itself order corfection of pleading
defects.10 2
When a case has been remanded by an appellate court to the
lower court for a new trial, the trial court is ordinarily left free
on retrial to permit amendments to the pleadings.10 3  If the deci-
sion is affirmed on appeal and remanded for such proceedings as
may be necessary to carry the decree into effect, it is generally held
not competent for the lower court to reopen the case to allow
amendments.""
When an appellate court affirms a judgment, the actual en-
forcement of that decree lies for all practical purposes in the
lower court; it would seem that such court should have the power
during the same term of court or some similar limited period, to
reopen the judgment and allow such amendments as would correct
errors in the record or do substantial justice to the parties.105
AMENDMENTS AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The rule considered above that an amendment should not state
a new cause of action assumes special importance where the statute
of limitations would bar a new action at the time it is offered. The
general rule is stated that if an amendment to the complaint sets
up a new "cause of action" and the Statute of Limitations has in
the meantime run against such action, the amendment does not
"relate back" to the first action and so it is barred by the statute. 00
But in the application of this rule there is great inconsistency. As
Io2Tinker v. Sauer, (1922) 105 Oh. St. 135, 136 N. E. 854; note,
32 Yale L. J. 506; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 161. In New
York under the C. P. A. mistakes, omissions, defects or irregularities
may be disregarded or amended on appeal, C. P. A., sec. 105, 109; Liv-
ingston v. Livingston, (1927) 246 N. Y. 234, 158 N. E. 313; Piotrowski
v. Cervi, (1924) 210 App. Div. 68, 206 N. Y. S. 655.
103Esch v. Ins. Co., (1889) 78 Ia. 334, 43 N. W. 229; Hardman v.
Kelley, (1905) 19 S. D. 608, 104 N. W. 272; Smith v. Gavin, (1894) 141
N. Y. 315, 36 N. E. 338; Reeves v. Cress, (1900) 80 Minn. 466, 83 N. W.
443; Flaherty v. Butte Elec. Ry. Co., (1911) 43 Mont. 141, 115 Pac. 40.
lO4Todd v. Bettingen, (1907) 102 Minn. 260, 113 N. W. 906, See note
in 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 263 for collection of cases in accord. See also
Girard Trust co. v. Null, (1914) 97 Neb. 324, 149 N. W. 809; Smith v.
Armstrong, (1870) 25 Wis. 517.05Hardwiche v. Winore, (1921) 208 Mo. App. 414, 235 S. W. 171;
Clark v. Scoville, -(1910) 198 N. Y. 279, 91 N. E. 800; "Slip Rule,"
Rules of Civ. Proc. Am. Jud. Soc., Bull. 14. art. 18, sec. 12.
106Cases infra this section. See also Tiffany, Death by Wrongful
Act, 2nd ed., sec. 187; 17 R. C. L. 817. Cf. Rules of Civ. Proce. Am.
Jud. Soc., Bull. 14, art. 18, sec. 4.
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we have seen, the rule of the United States Supreme Court was
for a time in doubt, but the later cases hold clearly that an amend-
ment changing the basis of claim from state to federal law or
otherwise from "law to law," does not state a new cause, and is
not barred by limitation provisions.'" In the state courts, when
an amendment changes the plaintiff's claim from one under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to one under a state statute, or
vice versa, some jurisdictions have held that a new cause of action
is stated and this is barred by the statute,""8 while others, now
perhaps more general, hold that this is only an "amplification" of
the original action.100 The latter decisions, it is believed, have
interpreted the term "cause of action" more in keeping with mod-
ern pleading ideas. The term should be interpreted as referring
to facts upon which one or more rights of action are based rather
than the rights themselves. Hence a change in legal theory only
should not be considered the statement of a new cause. And un-
less there has been so great a change in the material operative facts
that an entirely different fact situation is presented, the amend-
ment should be allowed." 0 As illustrating the divergence of
07See discussion and citation of the United States Supreme Court
cases, notes 59, 60 supra. The case of Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf,
(1913) 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135, 57 L. Ed. 355, there cited, allow-
ing an amendment after the period of limitation had run from a claim
individually under a state death statute to a claim as administratrix un-
der the Federal Employers' Liability Act, seems to have settled the
federal rule.
1O8Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., (1922) 183 N. C. 181, 111
S. E. 533 (death action; decision crticized in 32 Yale L. J. 198); Allen v.
Tuscarora Valley Ry. Co., (1910) 229 Pa. 97, 78 Atl. 34; apparently
overruled, Goldberg v. Friedrich, (1924) 279 Pa. St. 572, 124 Atl. 186.
Cf. Breen v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., (1918) 184 Ia. 1200, 168 N. W. 901(amendment by defendant refused; decision criticized in 3 MIuN-EsoTA,
LAw Rxviaw 59); Carpenter v. Cent. Vt.,Ry. Co., (1919) 93 Vt. 357, 107
Atl. 569; noted in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 242; City of Kan. City v. Hart,(1899) 60 Kans. 684, 57 Pac. 938; Birmingham Belt R. Co. v. Ellenburg,
(Ala. 1926) 110 So. 709.
109Nash v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., (1918) 141 Minn. 148, 169 N. W.
540. (Death action; criticized in 3 MINNESOTA LAW RBvIEW 132); Edel-
brock v. Minneapolis, St. P., & S. S. M. Ry., (1926) 166 Minn. 1, 206
N. W. 945, criticized in 10 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 417; Lammers v.
Chicago Great Western Ry., (1919) 187 Ia. 127, 175 N. W. 311, ap-
proved in 29 Yale L. J. 685. Vickery v. N. L. & N. Ry., (1914) 87
Conn. 634, 89 Atl. 277; Kansas City W. Ry.'Co. v. McAdow, (1916)
240 U. S. 51, 36 Sup. Ct. 252, 60 L. Ed. 520. See also cases cited,
Clark, Joinder & Splitting of Causes of Action, 25 Mich. L. R. 393,
410. Cf. Luce v. N. Y., etc. Ry., (1926) 241 N. Y. 39, 52 N. E. 409,
aff'g (1925) 213 App.-Div. 374, 211 N. Y. S. 184 claim on Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act barred by previous action on claim under Fed-
eral Boiler Inspection Act. 39 Harv. L. Rev. 399.
110This view is stated above in this article and is also developed
elsewhere, as in the articles cited in note 54, supra. In certain recent
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views, the following cases allowing the amendment after the
statute would bar a new action, may be cited; where it added more
particular or different allegations regarding defendant's negli-
gence ;111 where it alleged that the deceased was killed while being
carried as an employee instead of as a passenger;112 where it made
a party co-plaintiff who was originally made defendant ;"3 where
it alleged the provisions of a foreign statute upon which the orig-
inal action was brought ;114 where it charged defendant as an indi-
vidal rather than in a representative capacity ;"' where it set forth
that the action was brought by the widow as administratrix instead
of by herself and children as the real parties in interest. And the
following cases where the amendment was refused;"" where it
law review notes where the "legal theory" view of a cause of action
is assumed without consideration of any other view it is believed
that both the implications of that conclusion and the opposing author-
ities, particularly the United States Supreme Court decisions, are over-
looked. See 10 MINNESOrA LAW REvIEw 417f 424 and 3 MNEsorA
LAw REVIEW 132, criticizing cases cited note 109 supra, 22 IIl. L. Rev.
309, criticizing Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, (1927) 47 Sup. 60, and
cf. 12 Corn. L. Q. 525, reaching a result critical qf both Birmingham
Belt R. Co. v. Ellenburg, (Ala. 1926) 110 So. 709 and Luce v. N. Y.
& C. Ry., (1926) 241 N. Y. 39, 52 N. E. 409 affirming (1925) 213 App.
Div. 374, 211 N. Y. S. 184.1 1 1Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Hendricks, (1872) 41 Ind. 48;
Kuhns v. Wis. I. & N. Ry. Co., (1888) 76 Ia. 67, 40 N. W. 92; Deninger
v. Amer. Locomotive Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1911) 185 Fed. 22, 107 C.
C. A. 126; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co v. Young, (1903) 67 Neb. 568,
93 N. W. 922; Clark v. Ore. Short Line R. R. Co., (1908) 38 Mont. 177,
99 Pac. 298.1 12Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Salmon, (1875) 14 Kans. 512.1 13Buel v. St. Louis Transfer Co., (1870) 45 Mb. 562.
114Lassiter v. R. R. Co., (1904) 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E. 642; Lus-
tig v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., (1892) 65 Hun (N.Y.) 547, 20 N. Y. S.
477; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Pointers' Adm'r. (1902) 113 Ky.
952, 69 S. W. 1108.
1 5 Tighe v. Pope, (1878) 16 Hun (N.Y.) 180; Boyd v. U. S. Mtge.
& Trust Co., (1907) 187 N. Y. 262, 79 N. E. 999. In the Boyd case,
the court said: "I am satisfied that the amendment allowed in the case
at bar does not really bring in a ne.w party in the sense of making one
a defendant who was not in any sense a defendant before the process
and pleading were amended. It merely changes the capacity in which
the same person is sought to be charged. That person having actually
been brought into court by the service of 'the original process, there
seems to be no reason why he should not be required to contest upon
the merits any cause of action growing out of the facts alleged in the
complaint which the plaintiff may have against him in one capacity
rather than in another, provided that he is notified by a timely and
proper amendment of the precise capacity in which the plaintiff seeks
to hold him liable." McDonald v Ward, (1887) 57 Conn. 307, 18 Atl.
51.
"16 Pugmire v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., (1903) 26 Utah 115.
72 Pac. 385. See cases collected in (1905) 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 259. Cf.
also Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wulf, (1913) 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct.
135. 57 L. Ed. 355.
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substituted another beneficiary in place of the one named in the
original declaration, and thereby changed the amount of re-
covery ;117 where it set forth a statutory in place of a common law
liability for loss of services of a child ;11 where it stated a death
action in place of an action for personal injuries ultimately result-
ing in death. 119
A recent case, N. & G. Taylor Co. Inc. v. Anderson, 20 has
presented in striking fashion the harsh and unnecessary results of
the "legal theory" view of cause of action. Here a federal court
thought itself bound under the Conformity Act to follow the
Illinois decisions, which have carried this view to an extreme, "'
and it therefore disallowed an amendment which merely stated
how the plaintiff, an assignee of the claim sued upon, acquired
title to it.' Under the Illinois statute, such statement was necessary
and without it no complete cause of action was stated. The-dis-
senting opinion pointed out that " it was doubtful if the holding
would have been adopted by any other state of the union."'1 22
While the decisiou is extreme, it is not merely in line with the
Illinois cases, but is at least a logical deduction from the rule here
criticised. 2 3
THE DOCTRINE OF AIDER
At common law defects in pleadings might be cured by appli-
cation of the doctrine of aider. Aider might be had by subsequent
pleadings-"express aider"--or by verdict. The common law
rules are carried over and to a certain degree extended under the
codes.
Aider by Subsequent Pleadinus. This occurs most clearly
where a material fact not alleged by one party in his pleading, is
admitted by the other party in his answering pleading. Thus in
the early case of Brooke v. Brooke,"24 the plaintiff brought trespass
117 Atlanta K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Hooper, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.) 92 Fed.
820, 35 C. C. A. 24.
118City of Kansas City v. Hart, (1899) 60 Kans. 684, 57 Pac. 938.
i19Bolick v. Southern Ry. Co.. (1905) 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689.
12o(C.C.A. 7th Cir., 1926) 14 F. (2d.) 353.
"'-See e.g. Walters v. Ottawa, (1909) 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651.
criticized by Dean Wigmore in 4 Ill. L. Rev. 344; Davis v. St. Paul
Coal Co., (1918) 286 Ill. 64, 121 N. E. 181, criticized in 28 Yale L. J.
693.
"2Evans, J., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1926) 14 F. (2d.) 353, 356.
"'For criticism of the case and discussion of the problem raised
by the Conformity Act see note, 36 Yale L. J. 853, see also 28 Yale
L. J. 693.
124(-1664) 1 Sid. 184.
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against the defendant for taking a hook, but failed to allege in
his declaration that the hook was in his possession. The defective
declaration was held cured by the defendant's plea which brought
out the fact that he had taken the hook out of plaintiff's hands.
The doctrine is often resorted to under the codes.1 25 A serious
conflict has arisen, however, where the defendant refers to the fact
only to deny it. New York and some other jurisdictions have
asserted logically that a denial cannot supply the defect.126  Other
jurisdictions looking less to logic than whether the issue has been
fairly raised, have wisely held that a pleading may be aided by
such a denial.' 27 It has been held, too, that when plaintiff's plead-
ing goes upon the wrong theory, it is aided when defendant's
answer shows the correct one. 28  It seems generally held that an
omission in a cross-complaint cannot be aided by an admission in
the other pleadings not responsive to it because a cross-complaint
must stand on its own allegations.
129
Aider by Verdict. Aider by verdict was considered to be
founded in the common law and was independent of statutory en-
actment. 3 It was said to rest upon "the logical ground that the
verdict must be considered as true and as founded on legal evi-
dence and therefore it must be presumed that every fact necessary
to warrant such finding was proved on the trial."'"
The extent of the doctrine of aider by verdict at common law
and aider by verdict or judgment under the codes is indefinite. A
favorite statement is that a defectively alleged cause of action can
be cured by aider, but not the statement of a defective cause of
125Lux & Talbot Stone Go. v. Donaldson, (1903) 162 Ind. 481, 68
N. E. 1014; Maysville v. Truex, (1910) 235 Mo. 619, 139 S. W. 390;
Vickery v. N. L. & N. Ry., (1914) 87 Conn. 634, 89 Atl. 277; Thompson
v. Jacoway, (1911) 97 Ark. 508, 134 S. W. 955; Slack v. Lyon, (1829)
9 Pick. (Mass.) 62; United States v. Morris, (1825) 10 Wheat. (U.S)
246, 6 L. Ed. 314.
126Scofield v. Whitelegge, (1872) 49 N. Y. 259; Tooker v. Arnoux,
(1879) 76 N. Y. 397; Cf. Vonalstine v. Whelan, (1901) 35 Cal. 232, 67
Pac. 125, with Abner Dobie Co. v. McDonald, (1905) 145 Cal. 641,
79 Pac. 369.
127Whiteley v. So. Ry. Co., (1896) 119 N. C. 724, 25 S. E. 1018:
Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Ford, (1910) 141 Ky. 5, 131 S. W. 1010;
Garth v. Caldwell, (1880) 72 Mo. 622; Scott, Fundamentals of Pro-
cedure 151; 31 Cyc. 716.
'12See e. g. Brown v. Baldwin, (1907) 46 Wash. 106, 89 Pac. 483;
cf. Whittier, 8 Col. L. Rev. 535.
129Bullard v. Bullard, (1922) 189 Cal. 502, 209 Pac. 361. See note
32 Yale L. J. 291.
13OShipman, C. L. PI., 3d ed. 531.
"'LPhillips, Code P1. 73.
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action.'3 2 In view of the indefinite meaning attached to the term
"cause of action," this is not particularly helpful. A common
law case states that:
"Where a matter is so essentially necessary to be proved, that
had it not been given in evidence, the jury could not have given
such a verdict, there the want of stating that matter in express
terms in a declaration, provided it contains terms sufficiently gen-
eral to comprehend it in fair and reasonable intendment, will be
cured by a verdict; and where a general allegation must in fair
construction so far require to be restricted, that no judge and no
jury could have properly treated it in an unrestrained sense, it
may reasonably be presumed after verdict, that it was so restrained
at the trial."'"3
In fact through all the great number of cases which have
struggled with this problem, we find the main question the one
which is discussed elsewhere as a fundamental problem of plead-
ing-how specific or how general must the pleader be in his state-
ments. 3 4  The farther along the case has progressed, the more
intendments are assumed in his favor. Defects of pure form are
waived by failure to move or demur; defects of somewhat more
serious nature are waived by allowing the case to proceed to ver-
dict or judgment without attacking them; but if a system of writ-
ten pleadings is to be enforced, after all is said there will neces-
sarily be a class of cases where the court will feel that the plead-
ings have not served their purpose of bringing out the cause of
action even in a general fashion. This is shown by the code
provision that the two defects of want of jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of the action and failure to state a cause of action or
defense are not waived by failure to plead or demur.13   The test
of aider by verdict or by judgment must therefore be vague and
indefinite, since it turns on this difference of degree only, and it
will rest largely on-the circumstances of the particular case. Since
the requisite allegation must be contained by "fair intendment" in
the pleading itself, apparently the search is to find some general
wording which will seem to cover the specific detail now re-
quired.'36
'B2Tidd, Pr. 919; Shipman, C. L. Pl., 3d ed., 531, 532; Bliss, Code
Pl., 3d ed. sec. 438; authorities infra; Home Ins. Co. v. Duke, (1881)
75 Ind. 535; Mizzell v. Ruffin, (1896) 118 N. C. 69, 23 S. E. 927; Bene-
dict v. Union Agr. Soc., (1902) 74 Vt. 91, 52 At. 110.
"
33Jackson v. Pesked, (1813) 1 Maule & S. 234.
"34Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L. J. 259.
235Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 278, 279; Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9252 (dis-
cussed in the chapter on demurrer).
'"6See cases collected, Am. Dig. P1. Secs. 431-437; Cf. Garth v.
Caldwell, (1880) 72 Mo. 622; White v. Spencer, (1856) 14 N. Y. 247;
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Statutes in Aid of Defective Pleadings. In addition to the
other statutes of amendment and aider considered in this article,
the codes all contain a general provision which follows and often
amplifies that stated in the original New York Code of 1848:
"The court shall, in every stage of an action disregard any
error, or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which shall not
affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment
shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect. ' '1 7
VARLANCE
Closely akin to the matter just discussed is the problem of va-
riance, that is, the failure of the proof to conform to the case
pleaded. At common law objections of variance were made much
of, often with harsh results, so that even before the codes, as we
have seen, statutes had been passed to mitigate the harshness of
the former rule."38 The codes generally contain the following
sections on variance:
"No variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof
is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse
party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. Whenever it appears that a party has been so misled, the
court may order the pleading to be amended, upon such terms as
may be just.
"Where the variance is not material, the court may direct the
fact to be found according to the evidence, or may order an im-
mediate amendment, without costs.
"Where, however, the allegation of the claim or defense to
which the proof is directed, is unproved, not in some particular
Hill v. Haskin, (1875) 51 Cal. 175; Eberhart v. Reister, (1884) 96 Ind.
478; 5 Tex. L. Rev. 89. As indicated by White v. Spencer, an objection
to the evidence may be overruled; in other words a technical entry of
verdict may not be required. At common law there seems to have
been no method of taking advantage of a defect of this nature after
issue joined and before verdict. Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure
148-150. As to aider by verdict in criminal cases, see 6 Va. L. Rev. 285.13 First Rep. N. Y. Com'rs. on Pr. & P1. (1848) sec. 151. The
present N. Y provisions are contained in an entire article, art. 9 of the
C. P. A.: of the provisions, sec. 105 deals with mistakes, omissions,
defects and irregularities generally; sec. 106, error in ruling of trial
court; sec. 107 omissions in taking appeals; sec. 108, relief against de-
faults; sec. 109, mistake, defect or irregularity as affecting judgment;
sec. 110, mistake in court; sec. 111, mistake in remedy demanded; sec.
112, supplying defects by appellate court; cf. also n. 139 infra as to
provisions concerning variance. On the other codes cf. Calif. C. C. P.
1923 sec. 475 (expanded from the original form); Ohio Gen. Code 1926,
sec. 11364 (also expanded); cf. also Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9283.
138 See notes 4, 5 supra, also the appendix hereto.
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or particulars only, but in its general scope and meaning, it is not
to be deemed a case of variance, but a failure of proof."3 9
In some jurisdictions "whenever it shall be alleged, that a
party has been so misled, that fact shall be proved to the satisfac-
tion of the court, by affidavit, showing in what respect he has
been misled," before the court is to order the amendment. 40
It will thus be seen that there are contemplated three degrees
of lack of correspondence between pleading and proof; immaterial
variance, which may be disregarded by the court, or ordered im-
mediately amended without costs; material variance, where an
amendment may be ordered on such terms as shall be just; and a
complete failure of proof.' The situation theoretically differs
from that considered in the previous section in that there the de-
gree of generality or particularity of allegation was involved;
while here the degree of variation between pleading and proof is
in question. Yet the dividing line between the two situations is at
most shadowy and indistinct; for both will result from a lack of
certainty as to the facts of the case in the mind of the pleader.
Therefore, while many cases seem to treat the problem of variance
as an isolated one, it is in substance the fundamental pleading
problem of how a case or defense must be stated. 4-2 And except
as *it classifies the degrees of divergence between pleading and
proof and suggests remedies applicable to each degree, the cases
add little to the general theories of amendment discussed above.'3
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Supplemental pleadings under the code are the substitute for
the plea puis darrein continuance of the common law and the sup-
139 Calif. C. C. P. 1923, secs. 469, 470, 471. Of the many similar stat-
utes, cf. Minn. G. S. 1923, secs. 9281, 9282; Ohio, Gen. Code 1926, sec.
11556.
In New York under the C. P. A. an abbreviated form of the usual
provision is found in sec. 434; but this is. supplemented by rule 166
-which possibly is conflicting since it provides for amendment, seeming-
ly at trial, for failure to state a cause of action or defense and that a
complaint or counter claim need not be dismissed at the trial because
of failure of or defect in proof, if the evidence can be supplied. For
the question as to the construction of this rule, see note 64 supra.
14°First Rep. N. Y. Com'rs on Prac. & P1. sec. 145; Minn. G. S.
1923, sec. 9281; Ohio, Gen. Code 1926, sec. 11556.
'
41Bryant, Code Pleading, 2d ed., 305; 31 Cyc. 450-452.
24 2For discussion see, Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading,
35 Yale L. J. 259.
143See cases collected Am. Dig. Pl. secs. 386-399. Cf. note on vari-
ance in pleading and proof of defamatory words 2 A. L. R. 367; on
proving case not pleaded where amendment cannot be made 29 A. L.
R. 638, and generally 50 L. R. A. (N.S.) 14; note, 5 Texas L. Rev. 89.
AMENDMENT AND AIDER OF PLEADING
plemental pleadings of equity.144  They are, however, somewhat
narrower than the latter under most codes where they are limited
to matter arising after the beginning of an action.' 45 The follow-
ing is a typical provision:
"The plaintiff and defendant respectively may be allowed, on
motion, to make a supplemental complaint, answer or reply, alleging
facts material to the case occurring after the filing of the former
complaint, answer or reply."'
48
Under the codes of several states, however, a supplemental
pleading may be used to set forth facts which occurred before
trial but of which the party was in ignorance at the time of filing
his pleading.14 7 Due to the freedom of amendment permitted un-
der the codes the difference is largely one of name: whether such
matter shall be set up in an amendment or in a supplemental plead-
ing. 48
The granting of a supplemental pleading lies, like an amend-
ment, largely within the discretion of the court. 149  Where new
matter within the rules has occurred, and no injury to the other
party is shown, it is granted almost as a matter of course. 10 But
as in the case of amendments, a supplemental complaint, it is said,
144Holyoke v. Admas, (1874) 59 N. Y. 233; Shipman, C. L. Pl., 3d
ed., 360-362; Clephane, Eq. P1. 95-97.
145Cf. Clephane, Eq. P1. 95-97; Allen v. Taylor, (1830) 3 N. J.
Eq. 435. For the divers code rules, cf. Guptill v. City of Red Wing
and others, (1899) 76 Minn. 129, 78 N. W. 970, under the usual code,
with Reynolds v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (1897) 16 App. Div. 74, 44
N. Y. S. 691.
'!0Ark. Dig. Stat. 1921, sec. 1243. This provision, with but slight
variations in wording, is found in Alaska Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 930;
Cal. C. C. P. 1923, sec. 464; Colo. C. C. P. 1921, sec. 80; Idaho Comp.
Stat. 1919, sec. 6719; Burns, Ind. Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 427; Kans.
Rev. Stat. 1923, sec. 60-764; Carroll's Ky. Civ. Code 1927, sec. 135;
Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 9260; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 1280; Mont. Rev.
Codes 1921, see. 8191; Neb. Comp. Stat. 1922, sec. 8660; N. M. Ann.
Stat. 1915, sec. 4169; Ohio Gen. Code 1926, sec. 11368; Okla. Rev. L.
1921, sec. 323; Or. C. C. P. 1920, sec. 108; Remington's Wash. Comp.
Stat. 1922, sec. 308; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1920, sec. 5712.
'
47Iowa Comp. Code 1927, sec. 11221; Nev. Rev. L. 1912, sec.
5076-6134; N. Y. C. P. A. 1927, sec. 245; N. C. Cons. Stat. 1919, sec.
551; N. D. Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 7486; S. C. Code of Laws 1922, sec.
440; S. D. Rev. Code 1919,.sec. 2381; Utah Comp. Laws 1917, sec. 6608.
148Cf. Murphy v. Plankinton Bank, (1904) 18 S. D. 317, 100 N. W.
614, where it is held that amendment is the correct way to introduce
matter occurring before trial but not known to the parties until after-
ward.
"*'Pouder v. Tate, (1892) 132 Ind. 327, 30 N. E. 880; Medbury v.
Swan, (1871) 46 N. Y. 200; Copeland v. Copeland, (1901) 60 S. C. 135,
38 S. E. 269.
4 0Milliken v. McGrath, (1914) 168 App. Div. 110, 149 N. Y. S.484.
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must not introduce a "new cause of action."'' And if the original
complaint fails to state a cause of action, a supplemental pleading
cannot supply the omission, 5 2 because the function of a supple-
mental pleading is to bring in new facts which "will enlarge or
change" the kind of relief to which a party may be entitled, and
not to change an unripe action into one fully matured. 15 ' But it
has been held that the theory of an original pleading may be
changed in the supplemental one,5 4 and in the "equity" cases a
more liberal use of this pleading may be had. Thus where the
original bill charged the commission of waste and asked for an
injunction, a supplemental bill alleging ihat in the meantime a
mortgage had become due and asking by way of additional relief
that the mortgage be foreclosed was permitted. 15 Also, in a
divorce action, a supplemental complaint was allowed, which set
forth acts of misconduct by the defendant which occurred after
the filing of the original complaint.15 A supplemental petition
has been held properly allowed in an action for malicious prosecu-
tion, alleging damages incurred after the filing of the petition."'
Since the defendant does not have an opportunity of bringing
a new suit, there is perhaps a greater tendency to allow supple-
mental answers than complaints, as in the similar case of amend-
ments to answers. 15" Supplemental replies have also been recog-
nized though the occasion for their use is rare. 59
15'Reader v. Farriss, (1915) 49 Okla. 459, 153 Pac. 678, but with
strong dissenting opinion by Sharp, J., who said: "There was no
change of parties, the subject matter remained the same and the
object of the proceedings was the same." Maynard v. Green, (C.C.N.Y.
1887) 30 Fed. 643 (original bill alleged partnership; supplemental bill
alleged corporation); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hubbard, (1910)
198 N. Y. 136, 91 N. E. 261; Barker v. Prizer, (1897) 150 Ind. 4, 48
N. E. 4 (slander~ous words spoken after the beginning of the action).
152Morse v: Steele, (1901). 132 -Cal. 456, 64 Pac. 690; Keeler v.
Parks, (1913) 72 Wash. 255, 130 Pac. 111; see 16 Col. L. Rev. 357.
15321 Enc. P1. & Pr. 19; Am. Dig. P1., secs. 274, 279; cf. Eveland
v. Detroit Mach. Tool Co., (D. C., Mich. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 968. Cf.
25 Col. L. Rev. 1057.
'
54Childs v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., (1893) 117 Mo. 414, 23
S. W. 373, where the first pleading was framed on the theory that the
suit was at law and the supplemental pleading went on an equitable
ground.
155Allen v. Taylor, (1830) 3 N. J. Eq. 435. Cf. Murphy v. United
States, (1926) 16 F. (2d) 595; 27 Col. L. Rev. 606.
156Campbell v. Campbell, (1902) 69 App. Div. 435, 74 N. Y. S. 679;
Otto v. Otto, (1927) 220 App. Div. 130, 220 N. Y. S. 513 (acts of adul-
tery after institution of action) approved in 27 Gol. L. Rev. 748.11 57Geo. B. Scrambling Co. v. Tennant Drug Co., (Ohio 1927) 158
N. E. 282.
158 Cases cited Am. Dig. PI., sec. 280, 281; cf. Mackay v. Treat,
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An extensive use of supplemental pleadings is naturally limite I
by the well known common law view set forth above that the
plaintiff's right of action must be mature before he institutes suit.
How far this is a desirable view at the present time is perhaps
debatable. Of course a plaintiff should not be allowed to harass
by litigation a defendant who intends to pay his debt at the proper
time. But it would seem that such a defendant could be pro-
tected by a pleading showing this situation while at the same time
when the parties are actually in court and the obligation is con-
tested the parties may be heard without requiring a new law
suit to be brought. This rule was recognized in the former equity
cases and its application to "legal" claims would seem in the in-
terest ot procedural efficiency. 160
APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF THE STATUTES OF JEOFAILS AND
AMENDMENTS
The first Statute of Jeofails, passed in 1340, 14 Ed. 111, C. VI
is quoted in N. 5, supra.
The second Statute, passed in 1384, 8 Rich. II, C. IV is as
follows:
"Item, at the complaint of the said commonalty, made to our
Lord the King in the Parliament, for that great disherison in
times past was done of the people and may be done by the false
entering of pleas, rasing of rolls and changing of verdicts; (2)
it is accorded and assented, That if any judge or clerk be of silch
default (so that by the same default there ensueth disherison of
any of the parties) sufficiently convict before the King and his
council, by the manner and form which to the same our Lord
the King and his council shall seem reasonable, and within two
years after such default made, if the party grieved be of full age,
and if he be within age, then within two years after that he shall
come to his full age, he shall be punished by fine and ransom at
the King's will, and satisfy the party, (3) And as to the restitution
(1925) 213 App. Div. 725. 211 N. Y. S. 19; 25 Col. L. Rev. 1057; Hol-
yoke v. Adams, (1974) 59 N. Y. 233.159Cases cited Am. Dig. P1., sec. 282.
lo0See the law review notes, cited in notes 152, 153, 155, 156, 158
supra; especially 25 Col. L. Rev. 1057, arguing that the prohibition
against a new cause of action should be expressly abandoned, as it is
in reality in many cases; cf. also Allen v. Taylor, (1830) 3 N. J. Eq.
435, note 145, 155, supra.
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of the inheritance desired by the said commons, the party grieved
shall sue by writ of error, or otherwise, according to the law, if
he see it expedient for him."
The others are as follows:
(1413) 1 Henry V, c. 5 provided that in original writs, wherein
exigent shall be awarded, additions of the defendants' names shall
be put, and that surplusage of additions should not prejudice.
(1421) 9 Henry V, c. 4 provided that whereas the Statute of 14
Edw. III was variously interpreted, the King declared that the
justices should amend such records and processes as well after
judgment as before, in the same manner after as before judgment.
(1425) 4 Henry VI, c. 3 confirmed the preceding statute, continu-
ing it in the reign of Henry VI.
(1429) 8 Henry VI, c.c. 12, 15 provided that no judgment or
record should be reversed nor avoided for any writ, return,
process, etc., raised or interlined and that the judges might reform
all defects in the records, with certain exceptions, in affirmance of
judgments; that variance between the record and the certificate
thereof should be amended by the judges; and that embezzling
of a record, whereby any judgment should be reversed, should be a
felony.
(1432) 10 Henry VI, c. 4 provided that whereas entries of ap-
pearances had been made in the records of suits in which plain-
tiffs had never appeared, no officer should make such entry unless
plaintiff appeared in person.
(1439) 18 Henry VI, c. 9 made the preceding statute perpetual
and provided a penalty for an attorney if he did not record his
warrant the same term as exigent awarded.
(1540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 30 provided because of the great de-
lays in suits, after an issue tried there should be judgment given
notwithstanding any jeofail or mispleading, default or negligence
of any of the parties or their attorneys.
(1576) 18 Eliz. c. 14 enacted that if the verdict of 12 men should
be given in any action, suit, etc., the judgment should not be
stayed or reversed because of any default of form, or lack of
form, touching false Latin or variance or other defaults in form.
The act did not extend to appeal of felony or murder, treason or
other matter nor to writs of a penal nature.
(1585) 27 Eliz. c. 5. This has been called the most important of
the early Statutes of Jeofails and Amendments. See ScoTT,
Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law, (1922) 144. Some
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writers omit it from their list of the Statutes of Jeofails and
Amendments, apparently on the idea that it is not strictly a statute
of amendment because it governs the construction of demurrers.
As it makes many amendments unnecessary, its importance as
an amendment statute is great. It is as follows:
"That from henceforth, after demurrer joined and entered in
any action or suit in any court of record within this realm, the
judges shall proceed and give judgment according as the very
right of the cause of the matter in law shall appear unto them,
without regarding any imperfection, defect, or want of form in
any writ, return, plaint, declaration, or other pleading, process,
or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only which the
party demurring shall specifically and particularly set down and
express together with his demurrer; and that no judgment to be
given shall be reversed by any writ of error, for any such imper-
fection, defect, or want of form as is aforesaid, except such only
as is before excepted."
This statute was commented on in Heard v. Baskervilte, (1612)
Hob. 232 by Lord Hobart: "Now the moderation of this statute
is such, that it doth not utterly reject form; for that were a dis-
honor to the law, and to make it, in effect, no art; but requires
only that it be discovered, and not used as a secret snare to
entrap."
(1623) 21 James I, c. 13, extended the preceding statute.
(1664) 16 & 17 Car. II, c. 8, enumerated the courts and cases in
which judgment after verdict should not be stayed for default of
form in pleading.
(1705) 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16 provided that where any demurrer
should be joined, the judges should proceed and give judgment
without regarding any imperfection, omission or defect in plead-
ings and that all Statutes of Jeofails should be extended to judg-
ments entered on confession, nihil dicit or non sum informatus,
etc.
(1710) 9 Anne, c. 20 extended Statutes of Jeofails to writs of
mandamus and quo warranto.
(1718) 5 Geo. I, c. 13 provided that writs of error varying from
the record might be amended.
(1833) 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42 greatly enlarged the powers of
amendments at trial in case of variance, in particulars not material
to the cause. This it did by providing that the judges at nisi prius
should have authority to allow pleadings to be amended at the trial
when a variance appeared "not material to the merits of the case,
and by which the opposite party cannot have been preiudiced in
128 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the conduct of his action, prosecution or defence .. .on such
terms as to payment of costs to the other party, of postponing
the trial to be had before the same or another jury ...as such
court or judge shall think reasonable."
The statute of Wm. IV was the first result, so far as this
subject is concerned, of the wave of pleading reform in England
in the nineteenth century. See Clark, History etc. of Pleading,
11 Va. L R. 532, 5 Am. L. S. R. 716. Other steps in this reform,
the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, and finally the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act of 1873 are discussed in the text supra.
These are, of course, more than Statutes of Jeofails and Amend-
ments.
